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Firing Blanks?  
The Arms Trade Treaty  
 
 
 
Roderic Alley 
 
Roderic Alley is a Senior Fellow at Victoria University of Wellington’s Centre for 
Strategic Studies (Roderic.Alley@vuw.ac.nz). While accepting full responsibility for 
the contents of this paper, the author acknowledges the assistance of Anna 
Macdonald, Luke Roughton and Kevin Riordan. 
 
Deadly weaponry continues to find its way into irresponsible hands. Unscrupulous arms 
brokers defy UN arms embargoes. Ruthless leaders turn their arsenals on their own citizens. 
Ammunition depots are poorly guarded. State-owned weapons go missing. Civilian airplanes 
end up in the crosshairs. End-use certificates are not standardized and can be easily forged. 
Pirates wield grenade launchers and machine guns against merchant ships. Drug-traffickers 
outgun police forces. Just as with other commodities, the trade in arms should comply with 
vigorous, internationally agreed standards. All actors involved in the arms trade must be held 
accountable. 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 25 September 2014.i 
 
Introduction 
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by vote at the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly in April 2013 and opened for signatures two months later. It was 
approved by 154 states (later revised to 156), three against (Iran, Syria and North 
Korea), its 23 abstentions including some of the world’s key arms exporters and 
manufacturers (China, Russia, India) and leading arms buyers (Egypt, India, Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia). The treaty formally enters into force on December 24 2014 
having received its requisite fiftieth ratification (including Australia and New 
Zealand) three months earlier. The United States reversed the previous Bush 
Administration’s opposition and signed the ATT in September 2013. 
 
In brief, the ATT introduces specific, legally binding measures to regulate 
international trade, transit and brokering of conventional arms, including small arms 
and light weapons (SALW). Before authorising transfers, states parties must subject 
them to criteria established under a mandatory national control system. The treaty 
prohibits transfers where a UN authorised arms embargo is in place, where there is 
violation of international agreements relating to the transfer or illicit trafficking of 
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conventional arms, or where risks of genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes are known to exist. Where such prohibitions do not apply, an assessment is 
required as to whether a transfer risks undermining peace and security, potential 
violation of human rights, mounting of terrorist attacks, or conduct of organised 
crime. States parties are required to report annually to the UN on international 
exports and imports of conventional arms, and on the national laws and 
administrative procedures adopted for ATT implementation. 
 
From this three initial points deserve note. First the ATT is not, nor was ever intended 
as a disarmament treaty. Its prime function is regulatory of what already exists, not a 
programme requiring reductions in the global stock of conventional weaponry 
annually killing hundreds of thousands and costing a conservative US$70 billion a 
year and rising. Properly implemented however, the ATT offers scope to reduce those 
figures, its preamble recognising UN Charter Article 26 urging the least diversion of 
global human and economic resources into armaments.  
 
Second, the weaponry coverage entailed is relatively restricted. The key Article 2 (1) 
application includes all conventional arms falling within the seven categories 
provided by the UN Register of Conventional Arms, a voluntary international arms 
transfer reporting system. They include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and 
missiles and missile launchers. After considerable dispute involving objections by 
China and other states an eighth, equally important category of SALW was added. 
For many developing countries struggling with inadequate border protections 
against small arms transfers, this addition was critical. 
 
Not covered are surface to air missiles and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles 
(drones) equipped for military purposes and capable of weaponisation by a 
purchaser. Arms transferred under defence cooperation agreements are not voided 
by the ATT, though any relevant obligations must remain consistent with the treaty 
(Article 26). Arms supplied as gifts, leases, loans or barters are not included, nor are 
offshore licensed production agreements permitting local manufacture or reassembly 
of weapons covered by the treaty. Transfers to non-state actors are not explicitly 
identified, but required national control systems must assess them regardless of 
whether the receiving agent is a state or non-state actor. 
 
While a necessary framework for the ATT, the UN Register’s existing seven 
categories plus SALW could prove inadequate into a future of rapidly evolving 
conventional arms technology.ii This includes the digital and robotics applications 
beginning to reshape the arms industry. Neither weapons transfers of modular 
design nor unmanned ground vehicles are covered by the existing Register.  
 
Third, the political dimensions of the treaty are significant. Governments are under 
fuller notice over the consequences of their arms exports. The scope for public 
challenge of that previously authorised as a legitimate transfer is now widened. 
Facing greater scrutiny will be suspect arms importing through perversion of end 
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user certification, illegal transfers to rights violating non-state entities, or corrupt 
sales to armed vigilante formations. Necessarily closer scrutiny of the often opaque 
global arms trade places heavier organisational and information demands on civil 
society formations monitoring these activities.  
 
ATT monitoring and investigative procedures will also require sustained funding 
and expertise. Whether on the demand or supply side of the arms transfer equation, 
current monitoring of the conventional arms trade is far from watertight. While a 
single, universal conventional arms transfer control system is unlikely in the 
foreseeable future, what exists can gain normative strength once the ATT is in force. 
That will require a commitment of appropriate resources, technical expertise and 
political focus.  
 
This paper assesses key provisions of the ATT by first back-grounding its origins and 
contested formulation before assessing its transfer, prohibition and national control 
provisions. Throughout, an assessment is provided of the treaty’s legal effectiveness 
compared to existing, complementary instruments.iii The final pages discuss 
challenges facing ATT implementation and compliance and that are substantial for 
states of modest means including those in Oceania. 
 
Background to the ATT 
The ATT is culmination of numerous dedicated initiatives conducted over recent 
decades. In 1997, Costa Rican President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oscar Arias 
led other notables in summoning international community support for ethical 
standards and transparency in the arms trade. This was to better protect human 
rights and promote government accountability. In 1998, the European Union (EU) 
concluded its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, an indicative political measure 
designed to block member-state arms exports to locations provoking or prolonging 
armed conflict, risking human rights repression or fomenting state aggression. By 
2001, concerns over untrammelled SALW exports saw adoption of non-binding 
action guidelines agreed at a UN conference on the illicit arms trade, this termed the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (POA). The term ‘all aspects’ provided an 
opportunity to consider the illegal trade in SALW. In December 2006, a group of 
states led by the United Kingdom began investigating the feasibility of an arms trade 
treaty with common international standards for the export, import, and transfer of 
conventional arms. The UN General Assembly then requested the UN Secretary 
General to canvass member states over the feasibility, scope and draft parameters of a 
comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.iv  
 
Following reports by a Group of Government Experts (2008), and a UN Open-Ended 
Working Group of government representatives (2009), differences over a future treaty 
were narrowed to four main headings. They included goals and objectives (treaty 
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application at its broadest level); feasibility (requirements for a universal, objective, 
non-discriminatory and clearly defined instrument); scope (intended weapons 
coverage and range of transactions, transfers and sales); and, importantly, parameters 
(principles and criteria providing presumptions of denial of transfer and operational 
mechanisms). In 2009, the UN General Assembly resolved to establish a negotiating 
conference in 2012 for purposes of drafting a legally binding arms trade treaty. It 
mandated negotiations be conducted on a basis of consensus. 
 
None of this occurred in a vacuum. Mounting concerns over the human costs of 
unregulated arms transfers were vindicated by their lethal impacts in sub-Saharan, 
South Asian and Balkan conflicts; their employment in rampages of sexual violence 
and indiscriminate civilian slaughter; and their currency as recruitment and reward 
in internal conflicts. International non-governmental organisations including 
OXFAM, Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
sharpened their public advocacy for legal restrictions deemed essential for fulfilment 
of international human rights and humanitarian law obligations. The buttressing 
impact of customary international law was also increasingly evident. This occurred in 
the aftermath of conflict throughout the former Yugoslavia, the 1998 Rome Statute’s 
Article 8 listing of war crimes, subsequent establishment of the International Criminal 
Court,v and the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts commended to governments by a 2001 
UN General Assembly resolution.vi  
 
Controversies exposed … but only part resolved 
As the ATT formulation assumed shape differences began to sharpen. Typically 
during UN treaty making what is outwardly procedural – as over the consensus 
principle – can mask sharp political contention. Some of it is driven by domestic 
electoral considerations, seen when the United States pushed the July 2012 conference 
into postponement claiming lack of time. Here failure to reach consensus over a final 
treaty text pushed deliberations well beyond the Obama Administration’s looming 
presidential election November deadline. Meanwhile suspicions did not abate that 
the consensus rule might be used to either weaken the text or veto treaty 
negotiations. 
 
Over treaty content, dispute surfaced over what constituted an irresponsible transfer 
and means of treaty implementation. There were accusations that the planned 
instrument was too heavily weighted against the interests of arms importing states, 
and over the national standards required to assess risks of particular arms transfers. 
For example, would an assessment have to determine that there was an ‘overriding’ 
as distinct from a ‘substantial’ risk that exported weapons would be used to commit 
or ‘facilitate’ serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law? A 
more glaring textual difficulty identified – even to the point of ridicule – involved a 
draft Article stating ‘implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations 
undertaken with regard to other instruments’. This would have allowed a state party 
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to ignore any ATT obligations, flatly deciding that a contract to sell or transfer arms 
simply overrode the treaty’s requirements. While this wording was abandoned other 
concerns persisted, including the adequacy of provisions over ammunition and arms 
brokering where administrative regulation, not legal sanction, became the 
watchword. The question of application to entities other than states went unresolved, 
support coming from the EU and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), but strong resistance registered by China among others. 
 
Over ammunition, there was disappointment at its exclusion from the stated scope of 
the treaty beyond an implied inclusion under national control measure requirements. 
The United States led demands for exclusion from scope, its representatives never 
explaining why international controls would require changes to existing American 
recording or reporting of transfers. Here the United States has legislated to control 
exports of ammunition and ordnance under its Munitions List (Category 3), a sole 
exception allowing civilian use of non-combat shotgun ammunition. Exclusion from 
scope pertained more to American objections about ammunition movements being 
recorded or reported, not that they would be subject to national risk assessment. 
Objections that supervision of ammunition transfers would prove cumbersome and 
expensive had some traction. Yet numerous states have publicly reported licensed 
transfers without difficulty and without jeopardising national security or commercial 
confidentiality.vii 
 
Subject to further contention was discretion in the national control of arms brokering. 
This issue is critical given the volume of conventional weaponry transferred through 
intermediaries and arms brokers often closely linked to defence contractors, 
governments and intelligence agencies. Not defined under international law or the 
ATT, brokering is generally construed as the negotiation of an arms deal by an agent 
or intermediary typically requiring remuneration for such services. The 2007 UN 
Group of Governmental Experts on illicit brokering in SALW identified it as 
facilitating contact between potential buyers and sellers, location of future transaction 
opportunities, documentation management, and arrangement of necessary 
payments.viii Such ‘one-stop shop’ functions offer convenience and secrecy.  
 
In the event, good faith assumptions were deemed sufficient to infer that a state party 
cannot employ brokering arrangements to circumvent prohibitions on transfer or, 
likewise, conceal them as ‘gifts’. For the treaty, state party regulation of brokering 
pursuant to national laws (Article 10) may include registration or brokering 
authorisations. This is weaker than the non-binding POA’s language (should, not 
may) as well as POA Section II.14 suggesting penalties over illicit brokering 
conducted within national jurisdictions. (Stronger controls beyond regulation also 
exist in the Firearms Protocol’s Article 15, including licensing and registration of 
brokering, and disclosure of any relevant arms transfer documentation.) More 
significantly, and for a majority of states the ATT Article 10 ‘pursuant to national law’ 
requirement will tread water given the lack of such legislation rendering such activity 
illicit. An opportunity was lost during the ATT’s formulation to utilise salient 
knowledge identifying necessary components of a national brokering control system, 
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determining such modalities now left to slower, more variable states party 
processes.ix 
 
The Final Agreement: Humanitarian Principles Confront Consensus 
The ATT’s adoption in April 2013, soon opened for signature, occurred despite what 
some but not others considered a necessary but regrettable breach of the consensus 
rule. This followed adoption of a procedural provision, approved under UN General 
Assembly Resolution (67/234), permitting transmission of any finalised negotiated 
text for approval by the General Assembly. Opinion among conference delegates was 
sharply divided over whether breaking the consensus rule represented a dangerous 
precedent, or whether it was justified here to break a logjam caused by states bent 
upon the treaty’s derailment regardless of content. Regret was diluted by Syria’s war 
of attrition and humanitarian toll, negating any residual authority the Assad regime’s 
negative vote may have possessed. United States delegation head Thomas 
Countryman, while supporting the consensus approach in principle even indicated 
that, on this occasion at least, he was happy to vote in opposition to Syria, North 
Korea and Iran.x Contention over consensus aside, the procedure followed helped 
concentrate minds on the content of the planned instrument and negotiation of 
differences. 
 
Here humanitarian protection as a non-negotiable value won the day, its prominence 
within an arms control treaty unthinkable a decade earlier. Hence among the 
Preamble’s lengthy Principles was recognition ‘that civilians, particularly women and 
children, account for the vast majority of those affected by armed conflict and armed 
violence’, victims of such conflict requiring ‘adequate care, rehabilitation and social 
and economic inclusion.’ The Preamble further referred to respecting and ensuring 
respect for international humanitarian law and human rights as key principles, 
something not commonly found outside instruments establishing obligations for 
those purposes. Acknowledged was recognition that the ATT’s standards for arms 
transfers flow from these obligations. 
 
Elsewhere the Preamble identified the core objective of preventing and eradicating 
the illicit trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion; the role of 
regional organisations, industry, and civil society formations in facilitating effective 
treaty implementation; reference to complementary instruments; and the overall 
normative framework provided by the Charter of the United Nations. Separate 
consideration is now accorded two key ATT components: Transfers and National 
Controls. 
 
Arms Transfers 
Central to the ATT are its prohibitions on transfers of categorised weaponry. 
Whatever its aims and modalities, the ATT will operate within an international 
security environment of upward momentum in official, state to state conventional 
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arms transfers. That is depicted by Figure One, Table One indicating the scale of 
transfers to the Middle East since 2006. 
 
 
 
      Table One. European Union Arms Exports to Arab Spring States 2006-10 
 
Source: Mark Bromley (2012).’The Review of the Common Position on Arms Exports: 
Prospects for Strengthened Controls’, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers 
7 at 10, Table 2.  
 
Compared to the 2004-2008 period, a 14 per cent increase in the volume of total global 
arms transfers occurred between 2009 and 2013. Between both periods, arms imports 
to states in Africa increased by 53 per cent. This has widened the scope for illicit 
diversion and on-selling to those openly, often egregiously perpetrating international 
humanitarian and human rights law violations.xi And future buyers unwilling to 
accept more stringent rules may simply turn to sellers remaining outside the ATT – 
Russia, China or India for example. 
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Transfers initially conceived and conducted between governments on legitimate 
security grounds have seen end user certificate regulation distorted or falsified under 
conditions of social and security convulsion. On this, a 2011 report by the United 
Kingdom House of Commons Committee on Arms Export Controls, Libya and 
Bahrain in mind, concluded: ‘the present Government and its predecessor misjudged 
the risk that arms approved for export to certain countries in North Africa and the 
Middle East might be used for internal repression.’ It recommended reconciling 
conflicts of interest between the promotion of arms exports and an upholding of 
human rights.xii Seeing that recommendation gain global support is difficult given the 
variation with which states interpret existing export regime obligations.xiii  
 
Any impact exerted by the ATT on the total global arms trade is likely to be modest. 
Given their immense scale, the illicit leakage of no more than one per cent of 
legitimate transfers stands to wreak unsustainable harm. Without denying its long 
term potential as ‘an effective element of global governance’ grounded on a 
normative consensus shaping state practice, Cooper sees it functioning into the 
immediate future as a mechanism legitimising commercial sales, particularly 
North/North transfers.xiv Head of the US delegation to the ATT conference, Thomas 
Countryman, believed the agreement’s raising conventional arms transfer regulations 
closer to United States standards ‘levels the playing field and gives American 
manufacturers a better competitive position in the World.’xv In similar vein the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Arms Export Policy Department, 
acknowledging the ATT’s recognition of legitimate state interests in producing, 
exporting, and importing weapons, saw these aims furthered by an introduction of 
common standards.xvi 
 
What Article 6 more broadly considers ‘illicit’ is undefined, while scope for discretion 
is also evident in subsequent Article 7. Here a national risk assessment review of 
applications for exports of the eight categories listed must consider potential 
‘negative consequences’ for peace, security and human rights. Denial is permitted 
when an assessment determines existence of an ‘overriding risk’ of the exported 
weapons being used to commit or ‘facilitate’ serious violations of international 
humanitarian or human rights law. (In an explanation of vote, New Zealand with 
wide support stated that the concept of ‘overriding’ risk would be interpreted as 
‘substantial’ risk’.xvii). Denial extends to offences covered under international 
conventions or protocols relating to terrorism or international organised crime, or 
weapons used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or 
violence against women and children (Article 7.4).  
 
Article 8 provisions regarding arms importing permit discretion, subsection (2) 
requiring states to take measures to regulate imports only ‘where necessary’ or, 
under Article 9, to regulate transit ‘where necessary and feasible’. (Such qualifiers are 
absent in the already operative, legally binding Firearms Protocol.) Under ATT 
Article 8 (1) engaged state entities are to provide information helpful to an exporter in 
conducting a national risk assessment, including documentation on end uses or end 
users. Unspecified is the kind of information required, but indicative guidelines for a 
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state party undertaking this obligation in good faith are readily available.xviii They 
include types and quantity of weapons for export; reasonably grounded assessments 
as to their foreseeable uses; the political and security situation within a final 
destination and its adjacent neighbourhood; the intended end user; entities involved 
in the export; and intended route of the transfer including any trans-shipment 
considerations. There is due acknowledgement that workability will require 
appropriate cooperation between the parties concerned. That is supplemented 
through Article 14 and 15 provisions, where appropriate enforcement of national 
laws and regulations for ATT compliance mandates cooperation with other state 
parties for that purpose. 
 
For prohibitions, application occurs where there is ‘knowledge’ that the items 
concerned will be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
grave breaches under the 1949 Geneva Conventions or other war crimes. This 
Article’s reference to war crimes ‘defined by other agreements’ (Article 6.2) covers 
not just ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions but acts criminalised under the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. In a joint declaration following adoption 
of the treaty 98 governments, led by Mexico, stated that Article 6.2 also incorporates 
human rights treaties to which a State Party to the ATT is also a party.xix 
 
Unresolved is whether these provisions are adequate to meet the customary law 
standards required for war crimes committed during internal conflict. That is 
conveyed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009) which, while 
recognising the primary responsibility of states to respect and ensure the rights of 
their citizens and others within their territory of protections under international law, 
has affirmed that an obligation extends to all parties engaged in an armed conflict. 
Entailed is strict compliance with applicable obligations under international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Here customary international law has 
been solidified through jurisprudence on internal conflict asserting ‘the protection of 
civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of 
civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or 
no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare 
proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting 
hostilities.’xx 
 
Could the ATT have prescribed more ambitiously to proscribe the transfer of illicit 
conventional weaponry into internal armed conflicts? A solid majority to do so 
existed in 2013, doubtless influenced by the scale of humanitarian violations 
occurring in the Syrian conflict. Pragmatism prevailed however with recognition that 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are among the six top global 
arms suppliers. Their power of veto in the Security Council facilitates unilateral 
judgements, informed by not unbiased national intelligence estimates about the 
security and political conditions obtaining in prospective arms receiving locations. 
Unilaterally determined calculations of national interest, moreover, 
disproportionately advantage major arms exporters through Article 7.7. This allows 
reassessment of an existing transfer authorisation in the light of ‘new relevant 
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information’, an exporter no more than ‘encouraged’ to reassess following 
consultations with an importing state. That could see an exporter lifting previous 
restrictions following a regime change favoured by an exporter. 
 
In part, concerns expressed by some states over the ATT’s failure to confront 
weapons transfers to non-state actors reliably identified as known violators have been 
met by UN Chapter Seven invoked arms embargoes specifically listing non-state 
actors as banned recipients. As of December 2013, they included sub-state actors in 
the Central African Republic (since 2013); Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005); 
Iraq (2004); Lebanon (2006); Liberia (2009); al Qaeda and associated identities and 
individuals (2002); Somalia (2007); and the Taliban (2002).xxi  
 
Seemingly arcane, debate during the formulation of Article 8.1 over distinctions 
between ‘end use’ and ‘end user’ was intense. With both terms employed in the text, 
differences could persist over what constitutes a responsible end user entity?  (This 
issue has previously surfaced in exchanges between Wassenaar Arrangementxxii 
participants, and among those seeking agreed common standards in the EU’s Code of 
Conduct on arms transfers). During the ATT’s formulation, some sought a 
prohibition to any unauthorised end use, others wanting the language of end user 
utilised to better categorise particular non-state actors considered unauthorised 
receivers. United States officials, prompted by the ever vigilant National Rifle 
Association, voiced concerns that the term ‘unauthorised user’ might result in a 
domestic gun ‘user’ requiring formal authorisation. Both terms are employed in the 
Preamble where, during the March 2013 diplomatic conference, the phrase ‘including 
in the commission of terrorist acts’ was added.  
 
Of equal importance are questions about the robustness of ATT provisions on end 
user certification and legal enforcement measures. Article 7 requires all export 
authorisations be detailed and issued prior to export, such information being 
available on request to importing, transit or trans-shipment states parties. For SALW 
weaponry, states parties are to ensure ‘national definitions shall not cover less than 
the descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into 
force of this Treaty.’ While utilisation of the reasonably comprehensive SALW 
definition found in Article 4 of the 2005 International Tracing Instrument is possible, 
states parties need a UN document of standing listing all relevant SALW weapons 
descriptions and applications in existing instruments relevant to ATT 
implementation. That would include materials drawn from the Organisation of 
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Handbook of Best Practice on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (2003).xxiii  
 
National Controls  
Under Articles 3, 4 and 5.2 parties are required to establish and maintain effective 
national control systems for the export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering 
activities of categories of weapons covered by the treaty. This includes exports of 
CSS Discussion Paper 16/14     11 
ammunition, and parts and components used for assembling arms covered under the 
treaty. Made available to other states via the planned treaty secretariat are national 
control lists (Article 5.4), and designation of national authorities for maintaining the 
national control systems (Article 5.5). Article 12 requires maintenance of national 
records for each export authorisation or delivery of conventional arms for at least ten 
years. Article 13 requires provision of annual reports to the planned treaty 
Secretariat, export and import authorisations also circulated to ATT states parties.   
 
Yet prescribing these modalities faced the dilemma of some national control 
mechanisms regulating bilateral conventional weapons transfers being stronger than 
those offered under the ATT. But ranging from sound to poor to non-existent, the 
national control picture resembles, in totality, a patchwork unable to provide the 
comprehensive standards needed to meet ATT objectives. As indicated, many states 
simply have no such national systems. Evident is a twofold challenge of securing an 
international regime of national controls sufficient to prevent illicit transfers, this 
ineffectual without companion national measures curbing their domestic 
propagation. Some accord the latter even greater priority maintaining that weak 
domestic regulation, aggravated by stockpile theft, loss or corrupt sale within 
developing country recipients is of greater concern than illicit arms trafficking across 
borders.xxiv That does not apply consistently, but where it is deficient then it is 
seriously so, sub-Saharan African locations a telling example.  
 
Serious internal disintegration of central state institutions, collapse in the rule of law, 
and unbridled use of force to loot state assets for private gain, add to essential but 
difficult tasks of establishing effective national controls for states within, or recently 
emerging from conflict. Ending the abuse of arms to perpetrate impunity by the 
armed forces or the police requires appropriate stockpile control, weapons inventory 
management, sanctions for theft or loss of weapons, and accountability for weapons 
movement. These provisions are stipulated in the POA (Section II, sub. 17), ample 
guidelines available for relevant staff training in international humanitarian and 
human rights law.  
 
Article 16 of the ATT outlines scope for assistance in national control development. 
Possibilities identified include legal, legislative, technical, and material measures to 
foster stockpile management, demobilisation and reintegration, and model 
legislation. States parties are encouraged to contribute to the voluntary trust fund 
established to further these objectives once the treaty is in force. Breadth is accorded 
potential institutional modalities delivering assistance, including UN, regional, sub-
regional, non-governmental and bilateral mechanisms. A requirement that such 
assistance is provided on request underlines the need for governments to take the 
lead in establishing national controls. 
 
Similar inducement is evident in Article 11 (5) where ‘to better comprehend and 
prevent’ transfers parties are ‘encouraged to share relevant information’ over ‘illicit 
activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources 
of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations 
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used by organized groups engaged in diversion.’ Article 12 gives guidelines for 
record keeping, while Article 13 acknowledges the need to strengthen existing control 
methodologies. Here states parties are required to report to the planned Secretariat 
‘any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate.’ 
That objective faces numerous challenges of inadequate information sharing between 
supplier governments about known illicit transfers and problematic intermediaries. 
 
Readily identifiable are national supports required to implement national controls. 
They include reliable sources of intelligence and its objective analysis; unhindered 
Red Cross monitoring capacities; news media enquires not subject to harassment 
from any quarter; integration of national control mechanisms within programmes of 
post-conflict demobilisation; and professionally based recruitment, staffing and 
training of police, armed forces and customs personnel. As a state-based instrument 
the ATT could not directly acknowledge a role for non-state actor participation in 
national control functions, but this possibility cannot go ignored. It is already 
occurring with the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment process committing non-state 
actors to respect international humanitarian and human rights law, specifically 
through deeds of commitment on anti-personnel mines, gender, and children’s issues 
in conflict settings.xxv Nothing in the ATT precludes states parties from utilising 
similar forms of enlistment. Full implementation of previously cited Article 7 (4) 
(serious acts of gender-based violence or violence against women) will require 
state/non-state cooperation in several locations.  
 
The ATT envisages regional collaboration networks assisting national control 
systems. In Africa, more than three quarters of states have existing ATT relevant 
obligations, including those under sub-regional instruments. They include the 2006 
ECOWAS and 2010 Kinshasa Conventions designed to prevent the destabilising 
accumulations of SALW and ammunition, and the 2005 Nairobi Protocol on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons. They comprise commitments to establish national control 
systems, respect for international humanitarian law, and adherence to UN arms 
embargoes.xxvi Areas of greatest need include the Great Lakes, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, the Horn of Africa, and West and Central Africa. Despite opposition from 
North African states, the African Union agreed in 2011 on a common ATT position 
but indicated implementation was primarily a matter of individual state 
responsibility.xxvii Initiatives designed to scope African national implementation have 
been primarily exogenous in origin. 
 
Elsewhere regional mechanisms attempting to foster national controls have had 
stronger declaratory intent than proven institutionalised cooperation. Lacking have 
been multilaterally derived standards promoting responsibility and transparency in 
international ammunition transfers. Rarely are they subject to licensing provisions 
informed by obligatory standards deriving from international humanitarian and 
human rights law. This has been evident in the Caribbean, where illicit small arms 
and ammunition transfers have contributed to some of the highest homicide rates per 
head of population in the world. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has an 
Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) which has supported POA 
CSS Discussion Paper 16/14     13 
initiatives that include trans-border customs cooperation, information sharing, and 
ballistics identification. With the exception of some training programmes in Trinidad 
and Tobago, national stockpile management regulation is either weak or deficient, 
likewise arms brokering. Readily available to these governments is the Organisation 
of American States best practice Model Regulations for SALW brokering, while EU 
and OSCE principles provide relevant complementarities.  
 
The gap between intention and control implementation is explicable in some 
locations by a nexus linking illicit arms transfers to racketeering networks pursuing 
people trafficking, narcotics dealing, resource depredation and money laundering.xxviii 
Its existence is acknowledged by previously cited ATT Article 11 (5) requirements for 
information sharing over arms diversion for illicit purposes. That achievement will 
prove difficult: ring fencing national control systems, however well constructed, 
remains problematic in regions where porous borders are exploited to magnify 
insecurity. Such settings lack regional institutional cooperation over arms transfers of 
any sort, as is evident in South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Across the 
north and Southeast Asian littorals, declaratory homage is paid to cooperation, actual 
results less forthcoming. Southeast Asia has been a prime location for trafficked 
SALW, many weapons accumulated from its previous conflict locations. States here 
have been fully supportive of the ATT, while the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime stressed the need for 
continuing cooperation to control illicit arms transfers. But the region’s lack of agreed 
standards has left wide variation in national gun control measures. Unless they are 
tightened, ASEAN states are unlikely to forge the regional standards needed to 
properly complement future ATT participation. 
 
Treaty Implementation 
The preceding discussion has identified several issues confronting eventual ATT 
implementation so what more is usefully added? It is apparent that key future 
requirements are related, and involve a distinction between development of the 
instrument as an organic entity unto itself, and what is required of states to fulfil their 
treaty obligations.  
 
To the first and as aptly put by Norwegian representative Langeland to the UN in 
October 2013, the treaty upon entry into force should ‘be a dynamic and living 
instrument open for improvements and changes in the future.’xxix In part that will 
require an effective treaty Secretariat where ATT Article 18 offers guidelines. They 
include requirements of professional staffing, establishment and maintenance of 
national contact points, state party conference and service arrangements and, 
critically, facilitating ‘the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty 
implementation and (to) promote international cooperation as requested’ (Article 18 3 
d).  
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The last mentioned constitutes both a necessity and a dilemma, namely conducting 
essential chores of resource mobilisation from often reluctant governments, but 
dangers that this may overwhelm equally important Secretariat functions. They 
include building the professional expertise found helpful when advising 
governments on ‘flexible’ interpretations of key Articles 6 and 7 dealing with 
prohibitions and export and export assessments respectively. Close monitoring of 
state practice shaping customary law for Article 6 stipulations denying ‘illicit 
trafficking’ is an example, and building criteria needed to employ ‘knowledge’ at 
times of authorisation of arms transfer another. Article 7 language regarding ‘serious’ 
international humanitarian law violations as grounds for denial of transfer will 
require cooperation with, and promotion of relevant International Committee of Red 
Cross guidelines.xxx Aggregating and promoting durable benchmarks about what 
constitutes a serious human rights violation under Article 7 will test Secretariat 
expertise.  
 
Although they cannot join the treaty, regional and sub-regional intergovernmental 
bodies can build and maintain mutually advantageous, cooperative relations with the 
planned Secretariat. Complicated but necessary will be its role in relation to non-state 
actors. That will entail collection and analysis of reliable, independently sourced 
information about the extent of non-state entity treaty violations. Without conferring 
legitimacy on non-state entities, the Secretariat could record and transmit as 
requested information regarding their compliance with ATT provisions. This is 
information the Secretariat cannot ignore, subsequent responses decided by states 
parties or the UN Security Council. The admissibility of information from 
proceedings taken under the Rome Statute would be covered by the 2004 Negotiated 
Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the UN.xxxi  
 
The handling of any proposed treaty amendments or additional protocols is 
conveyed by Article 20, something not possible until the treaty has been in force for 
six years (2020), a further six months notice required. Subsequent approval of 
changes will require ‘every effort’ by states parties to achieve consensus; should that 
not emerge, then passage by a three quarters majority is stipulated. A Conference of 
States Parties is scheduled (Article 17.1) to occur no later than a year following the 
treaty’s entry into force and thereafter as decided by parties. There is no provision for 
a treaty review cycle, normally five years, though states parties can convene 
Extraordinary meetings provided those calls gain at least two-thirds membership 
support. As well as consolidating good faith obligations, a regular review process can 
attract support of states initially abstaining from treaty signature. Article 17 lists for 
future ATT review of implementation developments in the field of conventional 
arms; possible amendments in accordance with Article 20; issues arising from treaty 
interpretation; possible establishment of subsidiary bodies; and performance of other 
functions consistent with the treaty. Into the future, subsidiary bodies could include 
inspection mechanisms though doing so would face opposition.  
 
While regular treaty reviews would maintain attention over illicit arms transfers, an 
opposing argument cannot go discounted. Into the next decade, the ATT will provide 
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states parties more than enough with which to contend, over and beyond the 
additional time and resources devoted to international conferencing preparation and 
participation. This reasoning appeals to small developing states finding existing UN 
conference cycles onerous. 
 
The ATT stands to gain support from relevant UN Security Council determinations, 
an example being resolution 1894 of November 2009. In calling for the widest 
possible dissemination of international humanitarian law, it urged all states to 
provide relevant training for public officials, members of the armed forces and armed 
groups, personnel attached to armed forces, civilian and law enforcement personnel, 
and members of the judicial and legal professions. More recently, UN Security 
Council resolution 2017 of September 2013 addressed the SALW issue as a threat to 
international peace and security. Politically, and even if UN Security Council Chapter 
VII conflict reduction initiatives are vetoed, major arms traders face increasingly 
adverse global publicity once convincing evidence of ATT violation is publicised. 
Here added bracing is needed by a long overdue incorporation of SALW as an eighth 
category under the UN Register on Conventional Arms, that Register’s overall 
processes needing stronger promotion, funding, regional support, and data 
management.xxxii 
 
At the state level, the treaty offers an essential checklist of required domestic 
measures and where international assistance could be needed to fulfil relevant 
obligations. To summarise, that includes: national control systems for all transferred 
covered under the eight conventional arms categories (Articles 3, 4, and 5.2); national 
control lists (Article 5.3), and their availability to other states parties (Article 5.5); 
designation of relevant national authorities for these systems (Article 5.5); 
designation of at least one national contact point responsible for information 
exchange related to ATT implementation (Article 5.6); prohibitions (Article 6); 
national risk assessment applications (Article 7); measures to control arms imports 
and, when importing, information provision to an exporter conducting national 
export assessment, including end use or end user documentation (both in Article 8); 
necessary measures to regulate transit and trans-shipment (Article 9); national 
brokering regulation (Article 10); mitigation measures and cooperation and 
information sharing to prevent diversion of conventional arms to illicit markets or 
unauthorised end users (Article 11); national record keeping (Article 12); annual 
reporting to the Secretariat on export and import authorisations or arms deliveries to 
states parties (Article 13); relevant national legal and regulatory enforcement (Article 
14); and cooperation with states parties for effective ATT implementation (Article 15).  
 
That list is demanding but ATT ratification need not prove unduly daunting. Readily 
available online are legislative and regulatory templates.xxxiii Some experts see value 
in employing the matrix employed to implement UN Security Council Resolution 
1540 (2004), requiring states to establish laws prohibiting diversion to non-state 
entities of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.xxxiv 
Utilising existing monitoring modalities employed for dual-use goods and 
technologies is another possibility. Often these procedures and agencies are 
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adaptable for invigilation of SALW transfers, although here poorer states will require 
external technical assistance.xxxv  
 
State ratification and ATT implementation stands to gain from existing, related 
intergovernmental cooperation. Parliamentarians acting in global cooperation can 
foster state ratification.xxxvi Asia-Pacific parliamentarians have sought this objective 
through the July 2014 Siem Reap Plan of Action.xxxvii That was previously exemplified 
by the October 2013 joint Committee session on the ATT held by the consultative Pan 
African Parliament.xxxviii In the Western Balkans, representational functions have been 
fostered by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms (SEESAC). Established in 2002 and subsequently expanded, it liaises with 
governments and civil society to provide technical assistance and raise funds for 
specific SALW control projects. Directly assisted by the United Nations Development 
Programme and, for governments, incentivised by prospects of EU membership, 
SEESAC activities have extended beyond SALW control to embrace gender equality 
in security sector reform and disaster risk reduction. 
 
In the Islands Pacific, Australian development assistance has been utilised to enhance 
non-governmental, state level and regional cooperation prior to, and since the ATT’s 
formulation. Tangible outcomes included the 2011 Pacific Islands Forum agreed 
position stating leader support for an ATT that ‘would help deter and prevent illicit 
trafficking and proliferation of arms, including small arms and light weapons … and 
strong support for the development of a common Forum position on an ATT.’xxxix 
 
Preparations saw high level workshop activity that organised ATT diplomatic 
conference preparation and attendance, and drafting regional guidelines for POA 
implementation. The New Zealand government organised the drafting and 
dissemination of model implementation legislation for Pacific states.xl That was 
preceded by non-governmental and civil society activity fostering linkages beyond 
the state level, supplying advice and information to international officials, and 
facilitating conference participation.  
 
This activity is significant for monitoring ATT implementation, particularly flows of 
SALW into and between states. At a public level, advocacy will insist that ATT 
international cooperation objectives requiring consistency with states ‘security 
interests’ (Article 15) also embrace humanitarian considerations; that reporting and 
information sharing obligations ensure full, not partial transparency; and that what is 
‘illicit’ for treaty purposes is consistently interpreted, as a bare minimum, all treaty 
Article 6 prohibitions. Civil society organisations will likely insist that states parties 
apply the broadest possible criteria to compilation of national control lists. Bolton and 
Zwijnenburg sum up with pertinence, seeing the ultimate strength of the ATT 
deriving not from literal meanings of its text, but through its application and 
monitoring by civil society and concerned states. Monitoring mechanisms, they add, 
should anticipate potential circumvention strategies holding to account those states, 
manufacturers or armed groups seeking to exploit loopholes.xli  
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Conclusions 
The ATT’s most significant achievement has been to stake out higher ground for 
advancing humanitarian and human rights protections in armed conflict. The link 
connecting initial transfers of conventional arms to their subsequent utilisation has 
been shortened - whether that is facilitating crimes of sexual violence, employing 
child soldiers, or waging indiscriminate attacks against civilian locations of no 
military utility. Approved transfers of conventional arms lose legitimacy once 
unambiguously linked to serious humanitarian law violations - culpable offences 
incurring legal consequences Accordingly the gap differentiating ‘legitimate’ 
conventional arms transfers to ‘responsible’ users, from negligent trade to those of 
known unreliability has narrowed. It is a shrinkage highlighted by vulnerability to 
regime collapse, notably in the Middle East. However should regimes begin to 
resolve long standing internal differences, institute effective small arms stockpile 
management, and instil command responsibility through security sector reform, then 
clearer air will emerge to facilitate legitimate transfers.  
 
This paper concludes that the ATT provisions on arms brokering are inadequate. 
What begins as a ‘white’ transfer may through brokering enter the realm of ‘grey’, 
and thence to outright ‘black’. Previously discussed ATT Article 11 provisions on 
diversion are constructive, but uneasily straddle differences between states (eg 
Canada and the US) treating it as unwarranted diversion between seller A and receiver 
B, and those (eg Mexico) interpreting it as dispersion beyond end point reception. The 
ATT does not have an end use monitoring mechanism allowing exporting states to 
check where the arms they have transferred are finally sent, or how they are used. 
This paper has argued that even a slight diversion of the high volume of legitimate 
transfers harbours serious risk of ATT violation. 
 
When reviewing the controversies that marked the ATT’s formulation, compromises 
reached for their resolution will influence the quality of future implementation. No 
one size fitting all, we have seen that the ATT’s language contains numerous ‘as 
appropriate’ or ‘as feasible’ qualifiers regarding national discretion. The test will be 
whether flexibility designed to foster workability comes at a cost of consistent treaty 
interpretation and application. EU members with different allies and arms sales 
destinations have encountered difficulties in forging a common position on ATT 
interpretation.  
 
Differences identified reflect a deeper, longer running cleavage. This involves the 
contested ground of core security, and how humanitarian as distinct from sovereign 
territorial imperatives might assume appropriate salience. Hopes of balancing such 
imperatives by treaty means do not diminish their scope for polarisation. Contest 
here has a raw immediacy, courtesy live television’s coverage of conflict’s civilian toll 
in the Middle East. Weapons supplied in good faith to Syrian rebel forces, but ending 
up in the hands of the Islamic State have shocked publics. That has imparted urgency 
to ATT ratification and implementation.  
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Certainly the ATT has thrown into shaper relief the primary importance of state 
responsibility for effective implementation. That begs questions the treaty could not 
realistically confront: fragile, incompetent or corrupt state agency functions; 
malfunctioning rule of law and widespread impunity of state operatives; collusion of 
state and non-state entities manipulating domestic arms transfers for predation; 
completely absent or seriously defective record keeping; the use of arms to perpetrate 
gross, unreported and unprosecuted human rights violations; and the agility, local 
knowledge and resourcefulness of international arms brokers and traders exploiting 
licence and end use loopholes to advantage. Nor has controversy over consensus 
procedure abated: contest over its application, not decision by vote, could inflame 
Rules of Procedure discussions in future meetings of states parties. 
 
Despite these concerns the ATT has sown seeds for future amelioration, most 
conspicuously through space provided for enhanced international cooperation 
permitting states to institutionalise national control mechanisms. There is also 
breadth in the encouragement given to information sharing and exchange, an indirect 
acknowledgment of an ATT need to confront ongoing challenges through 
modification. List sharing between states will open opportunities to expand beyond 
the seven plus one conventional weapons categorisation offered by the treaty, 
hopefully to embrace the difficult, but increasingly critical issues of exported licensed 
production and technology transfers. These developments will not stand still, their 
expansion widening scope for possible ATT circumvention.  
 
Failure to confront change will see the treaty a worthy but secondary instrument 
determining state practice. State peer pressure urging movement towards norms of 
appropriateness outlawing nefarious arms transfers will prove important. Assistance 
is required for smaller states to foster and implement national measures, and to ease 
burdens of treaty compliance reporting. Assistance is also required to strengthen 
existing, complementary arms transfer control mechanisms. Currently they leave 
gaps for those willing to hunt them out for bad faith purposes of deliberate evasion. 
A circle of control has not yet been joined, but the ATT has given existing legal 
regimes greater scope to move closer towards that goal. That includes contributions 
from regional systems, and their need to move beyond undue reliance on 
international institutional or external bilateral funding, and towards greater 
ownership of indigenous capacity and expertise. This point embodies an overall 
conclusion: the ATT’s legal structure will require not just cooperation across its 
designated, contrasting levels of responsibility, but enduring state commitment for 
durable implementation. 
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